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LABOR LAW: ARE CREATIVE ARTISTS INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS OR EMPLOYEES?
Few legal classifications have created greater controversy in applica-
tion than attempts to distinguish an employee from an independent con-
tractor.' The decision of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
in Aaron Spelling Productions, Inc. v. Society of Composers and Lyricists2
is no exception. The Board held that composers and lyricists are in-
dependent contractors and, consequently, are expressly exempted from
the National Labor Relations Act and union representation.3
The case was tried before a hearing officer of the NLRB. The Soci-
ety of Composers and Lyricists sought to represent all composers and
lyricists employed by the motion picture and television studios.4 The stu-
dios contended that under the National Labor Relations Act,5 the peti-
tion should have been dismissed because the composers were
independent contractors rather than statutory employees.
Congress amended section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
in 1947 to exclude independent contractors from the definition of "em-
ployee." 6 The purpose of this amendment was to encourage the NLRB
and the courts to apply general agency principles when distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors.7 Thus, in defining the
relationship between the studios and the composers in Spelling, a fact-
based analysis was critical.' The NLRB applied a "right to control" test:
Where the one for whom the services are performed retains the
right to control the manner and means by which the result is to
1. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944). See generally 9 S.
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1012A at 16-29 (3d ed. 1967); Comment, Deter-
mination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social Legislation, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1015
(1941).
2. No. 31-RC-5755, slip. op. (Dec. 14, 1984).
3. Id. at 7.
4. The respondents named in the petition were Aaron Spelling Productions, Inc., Colum-
bia Pictures Industries, Inc., Lorimar Productions, MGM/UA, MTM Enterprises, Inc., Orion
TV Productions, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Embassy Pictures/Embassy Television,
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Pictures, and
Warner Brothers, Inc.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1947).
6. Id. The act protects an "employee" only, and specifically excludes "any individual
having the status of an independent contractor."
7. See 93 CONG. REC. 6441-442 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1537.
8. NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382 (3d Cir. 1979); Associated Gen. Con-
tractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 271, 282 (9th Cir. 1977).
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be accomplished, the relationship is one of employment; while,
on the other hand, where control is reserved only as to the re-
sult sought, the relationship is that of an independent contrac-
tor. The resolution of this question depends on the facts of
each case, and no one factor is determinative. 9
Based on this test, the NLRB concluded that an employer-employee rela-
tionship did not exist. The studios exercised control over the final prod-
uct and not over the means necessary to produce that product.' ° The
NLRB explained that there were factors which tended to support both
an employee and an independent contractor relationship. "There is no
question that the studios exercise control over the musical compositions
and lyrics that they contract with composers . . . to produce."'" How-
ever, this general control over the final product was inadequate to justify
a finding of an employee relationship. 12
In making its determination, however, the NLRB appears to have
relied on a strict construction of the "right to control" test to the exclu-
sion of other relevant considerations. The focus on the lack of con-
straints placed on the musicians resulted in a cursory view of other
evidence that might have weighed in favor of a different result. While the
control test is an important factor in distinguishing employees from in-
dependent contractors, it is not the sole factor.' 3 The United States
Supreme Court has counseled that "there is no shorthand formula or
magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all incidents of
the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being
decisive.""
In Spelling, the NLRB implied that creative artists are beyond the
scope of the normal agency analysis. Citing American Broadcasting
Company, '" it concluded that the autonomy inherent in the composing of
music necessitated a finding of an independent contractor relationship.
This reasoning seems contrary to the fact-based analysis that was at the
heart of the 1947 amendment to the National Labor Relations Act. 16
With this in mind, the following analysis examines the Spelling decision
9. Spelling at 6-7, citing Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int'l
Union of N. Am. AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958).
10. Spelling at 7.
1l. Id.
12. Id.
13. NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912, 919 (11 th Cir. 1983); NLRB
v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975).
14. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).
15. 117 NLRB 13, 18 (1957).
16. See supra note 7.
[Vol. 6
LABOR LAW
in light of several factors that are important in determining whether mu-
sical composers are properly classified as independent contractors or
employees. "
The most significant factor tending to show employment is the right
of the employer to control the details of the employee's work. Con-
versely, freedom from such control tends to establish the relationship of
independent contractor. 8 It is irrelevant whether the employer exercises
the right to control, so long as the right exists. 9 In Spelling, the NLRB
did not confine its analysis to whether the studios possessed the right to
control the details of the composers' work, but focused instead on the
minimal restrictions placed upon the composers by the studios. In doing
so, the board appears to have misapplied the "right to control" test.
First, the record indicates that "in recognition of, and in deference
to, the creative process . . .[the studios] avoid[ed] interfering with the
freedom of composers to set their own hours, to work at their own pace,
and to work wherever they please."2 If an employment relationship ex-
ists, the fact that a certain amount of freedom is allowed or is inherent in
the nature of the work involved does not change the character of the
relationship, particularly where the employer has general supervision and
control.2 Second, although the studios avoided involving themselves in
the details of the composers' work, contracts between the two entitled
them to do so.22 The NLRB attempted to minimize the relevance of this
language by labeling it as boilerplate. Nevertheless, it is not the actual
exercise of the right to control that is important but, as here, the contrac-
tual right to do so.23
The providing of materials or equipment is also relevant to deter-
mining whether an employee or independent contractor relationship ex-
ists.24 If the employer furnishes the materials necessary for the
accomplishment of a task, an employer-employee relationship is more
likely. While most composers own the basic tools of their trade, it is
17. Consolidated from current case law, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220
(1958), and legal scholarship.
18. 18A T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS - LABOR LAW § 12 (1972).
19. Id.
20. Spelling at 6.
21. Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 1978);
Grant v. Woods, 71 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654, 139 Cal. Rptr. 533, 536 (1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(c) (1957).
22. Spelling at 5-6.
23. See supra note 21.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (1957). See also Stewart. Empirical
Answer to the Problem of Determining "Employee" or "'Independent Contractor" Status. 58
TAXES 747, 752 (Nov. 1980).
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common practice for the studios to supply the composers with scoring
paper, pencils and erasers, or permit them to charge such items to the
studio's account. The studios also make available an office with a piano
in it, although the composer is under no obligation to use it. During the
course of a project, the studio delivers videocassettes, timing sheets, and
other necessary materials to the composer's home by messenger, and
picks up scoring sheets the same way. Neither the cost of the items nor
the cost of the messenger service are deducted from the composer's fee.
Another important consideration is whether the employer provides
the employee with benefits or makes payroll deductions.25 Generally, the
studios do not furnish the composers with the amenities normally associ-
ated with an employer-employee relationship: life and health insurance,
holiday and vacation pay, or other fringe benefits. However, in Spelling,
the NLRB failed to fully explore the problems created by the composers'
unique tax situation.
Many composers operate personal "loanout" corporations for tax
purposes.26 The artist is generally the sole stockholder.27 Since exclusive
rights to the composer's services are vested in the corporation, studios
contract with the composer through this corporate entity. The studio
pays the loanout corporation, which in turn pays the composer. The stu-
dio makes no payroll deductions.2" The agreement between the loanout
corporation and the studio generally contains a provision that explicitly
states that the contract creates an independent contractor relationship.29
Having thus elected to use the independent contractor form for tax pur-
poses, it is argued that the artist should be viewed as such for all
purposes.3°
A contrary view argues that the fiction of the "loanout" corporation
should be discarded for purposes of this analysis.3' The loanout corpora-
tions pay the artist and provide him with employee benefits (albeit,
through a corporate fiction).32 If a composer is paid directly (rather than
through a loanout company), the studios make the standard payroll de-
ductions for taxes and social security themselves. Since it is not neces-
25. A. Duie Pyle, 606 F.2d at 385.
26. Spelling at 3.
27. Frackman, Failure to Pay Wages and Termination of Entertainment Contracts in Cali-
fornia, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 333, 364-65 (1979).
28. Spelling at 2.
29. "Lender shall furnish [composer's] services hereunder as an independent contractor."
Current Developments in the Television Industry: Legal, Business and Financial Aspects, USC
ENT. LAW INST., 332, 338 (E. Barton & E. Kleinberg eds. 1977).
30. Frackman, supra note 27, at 372.
31. Id. at 367.
32. Id. at 366.
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sary that the studios directly pay the composer's wages, pension and
other benefits, it follows that the proliferation of the loanout company
may have little effect in determining the composer's status.13 In short,
the studio ensures that the composer receives such contributions either
by paying him or her directly or through the avenue of the loanout
company.
Another factor in determining the worker's status is the degree of
skill required in a particular field.34 It is the worker's unique skill that
makes the independent contractor's services a marketable item. Thus,
the greater the skill required, the greater the indication that the worker is
an independent contractor.35 Composers are highly skilled artists who
receive no training whatsoever from the studios and whose talent and
experience play an important role in their initial selection for work.
Clearly, the composer's special skills militate in favor of an independent
contractor designation.
An independent contractor relationship is also implied where the
service contracted for is distinct from the principal's business.36 The
composing of music, although an integral component of a successful pro-
duction, is nevertheless a different trade than that of producing movies.
Composers are also under no obligation to accept offers for work, though
some testified that they feared they would not be considered again if they
exercised this option.37
In contrast, an employer-employee relationship is implied if the con-
tract contemplates that substantially all of such services are to be per-
formed personally by the individual. 3' This was particularly true in
Spelling because composers were hired for their unique styles and their
assignments could not be delegated to others without the studios'
consent.
The relationship of an independent contractor is generally linked to
a specific time period, whereas that of employment generally contem-
plates a continuous or indefinite rendering of services. 39 This principle is
difficult to apply to Spelling because of the inherent differences between
motion picture and television production. In motion picture production,
studios hire composers on a picture-by-picture basis, typically for a pe-
33. Id. at 371.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(d) (1957); Comment, Agency.- In-
dependent Contractors in California, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 58-59 (1941).
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982).
37. Spelling at 3.
38. Stewart, supra note 24, at 750.
39. Stewart, supra note 24, at 752.
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riod of six to ten weeks. In television production, the studio will usually
contract with the composer for an entire season and, in some instances,
for subsequent seasons as well. Still, contracts for remuneration for a
specific period favor a finding of an independent contractor
relationship.'
Another important factor in distinguishing an employee from an in-
dependent contractor is the risk of loss and opportunity for profit, and
the degree of proprietary interest.41 An employee is generally one who is
precluded from earning a profit in excess of his stated compensation or is
insulated against sustaining losses.42 Composers are paid a flat fee for
their services, even if the producer ultimately decides not to use the com-
poser's work. Any risk of loss or opportunity for profit falls solely on the
studio. Furthermore, the composers have no capital invested in the pro-
duction. This absence of proprietary interest, although ignored by the
NLRB in Spelling, points toward an employee relationship.
The worker's payment structure can also help in determining
whether an independent contractor or an employee relationship exists.43
Generally, the agent and the studio negotiate the composer's fee. Com-
pensation varies with the composer's reputation, the project's budget,
and various other administrative factors. The composer receives a lump
sum payment for the work, as opposed to incremental payments, which
increases the likelihood that he or she is an independent contractor.
44
However, in reaching its decision in Spelling, the NLRB glossed
over some other important factors concerning the studios' compensation
structure. An employer-employee relationship is indicated when travel
and equipment expenses are covered by the principal.45 The studios
either provide or reimburse the composer for all needed equipment.
When travel is necessary, the expenses are covered. If delays require a
commitment beyond the designated period, the composer is compensated
for the extra time. Finally, even if the artist's composition is not used,
the composer is still compensated in full.
While the actual belief of the parties as to their legal relationship is
relevant to this analysis, it is of slight importance. 46 Contractual termi-
nology is only of probative value if, as a matter of law, a different rela-
40. Id.
41. NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 132 (lst Cir. 1981); Brown v. NLRB.
462 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008 (1972).
42. Stewart, supra note 24, at 752.
43. Merchants, 580 F.2d at 975; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (1958).
44. Id.
45. Stewart, supra note 24, at 752.
46. KHEEL, supra note 18, at 653.
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tionship exists.47 Consequently, while contracts vary from studio to
studio, general language that implies an independent contractor relation-
ship carries little evidentiary value.
Despite the evidence favoring an employer-employee relationship
under the foregoing agency analysis, the composers' chances of success
on appeal are minimal. "A reviewing court may not displace the
NLRB's choice between two fairly conflicting views even though the
court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo."48 Only by showing that there was no "substantial
evidence" for the board's decision would a different result be in order.49
Determining the composers' relationship with the studios is a com-
plex problem. The NLRB's focus on the unique creative nature of the
composer's work, however, is not the answer. Under such an approach,
the impact of the board's decision could be greatest within the entertain-
ment industry, where individual creativity is not only encouraged, but is
a necessary commodity.
The analysis used in Spelling can lead to unpredictable results and
controverts the reasoning behind section 2(3) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act.50 Clearly, predictable results can only be achieved through
the consistent application of agency principles.
Richard Rasmussen
47. Grant, 71 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 537; Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 943, 471 P.2d 975, 88 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1970).
48. United Insurance, 390 U.S. at 260.
49. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
50. See supra note 7.
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